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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 950384-CA

vs.

j
i
j

MARVIN JEAN JACQUES,

i:

Priority N o . 2

Defendant/Appellant.

;

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(1992 as Amended) whereby a defendant in a district court
criminat action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final order for anything other than a first degree or capital
felony.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in allowing the non-expert

testimony of Ragan to authenticate the alleged letters written by
Jacques?
A trial court's determination of legal questions is reviewed
for "correctness."

State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).

However, a trial court's application of a given set of facts to a
particular legal rule is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-39 (Utah 1994).

A

trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is beyond the

1

limits of reasonableness or if the actions of the judge are
inherently unfair.

State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah

1994), State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993).
This issue was preserved by Jacques' oral objection at trial
(3/14/95 Tr. at 89-90) and by his written post-trial motion for
arrest of judgment (R. 281-284) argued at sentencing (4/19/95
Tr.).
2.

Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support

the verdict?
The appropriate standard of review for this issue is:
"[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences which might be
drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
jury verdict.

A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient

evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted."

State v. Dunn, 208 Utah

Adv. Rep. 100 (Utah 1993).
This issue was preserved by Jacques' motion for arrested
judgment and acquittal (R. 281-84) and at the sentencing hearing
(4/19/95 Tr.).
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) (1994):
(4)

Prohibited Acts D—Penalties
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and
intentionally:

2

(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or
written order for a controlled substance, or to
utter the same, or to alter any prescription or
written order under the terms of this chapter.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-25-9 (1992):
Any writing may be proved either:
(1)

by any one who saw the writing executed; or

(2)

by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting
of the maker; or

(3)

jjy a subscribing witness.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 901 (1995):
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is
satisfied by evidence that the matter in question is what
its propenent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by
way of limitation, the following are examples of
authentication or identification conforming with the
requirements of this rule:
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert
opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based
upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the
litigation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Defendant, Marvin Jean Jacques, was convicted by jury in the
Fourth Judicial District Court on March 15, 1995, of making or
uttering a forged prescription, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii). On April
19, 1995, Jacques was sentenced by Judge Guy R. Burningham to the
3

Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed five
years (R. 304-05).
B. Course of Proceedings and Trial Court Disposition
Marvin Jean Jacques was charged by information filed on
November 1, 1994, with making or uttering a forged prescription
for a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) (R. 1). Prior to
preliminary examination, Jacques filed with the Fourth Circuit
Court, Spanish Fork Department:

a motion for discovery (R. 17-

18), a motion to suppress the photo line-up (R. 15-16), and a
motion demanding a speedy trial (R. 12-13).
A Preliminary Hearing was held in this matter on November
28, 1994 (R. 29-31).

Prior to commencement of the hearing, and

at Jacques' request, the circuit court appointed the Utah County
Public Defenders Association as advisory counsel only and ordered
that Jacques would act as his own legal counsel (R. 22-23).
Following the Preliminary Hearing, Jacques was bound-over to
the Fourth District Court on the charge (R. 33).

At an

arraignment held in district court on December 7, 1994, the
Honorable Guy R. Burningham presiding, Jacques entered a plea of
"not guilty" to the charge (R. 36-37).
Prior to trial, Jacques filed with the district court a
motion in limine with regards to prior convictions (R. 58-59) and
a motion to suppress witness identification evidence (R. 40-46,
60-62).

On February 2 and 10, 1995, an evidentiary hearing was

conducted before Judge Burningham on Jacques' pre-trial motions
4

and on his objection to the State's request that he submit a
hand-writing sample for analysis.
At the close of the evidentiary hearing Judge Burningham:
denied Jacques' motion respecting a speedy trial; granted
Jacques' motion to suppress the photo line-up; granted Jacques'
motion to suppress post photo line-up identification evidence of
witnesses Valarie Seitz, Peggy Wiscombe, and Ryan Ollerton;
denied Jacques' motion to dismiss; and overruled Jacques'
objection to the State's request for a hand-writing sample (R.
175-76, 186-87, 202-05).
On March 14-15, 1995, a jury trial was held in this matter
with Judge Burningham presiding and Jacques appearing, pro se
(R. 272-276).

Jacques was convicted by the jury on March 15,

1995 (R. 270). After trial, Jacques filed with the district
court a motion to arrest judgment and a motion for acquittal (R.
281-84).

Both motions were denied by Judge Burningham and

Jacques was sentenced to an indeterminate term of up to five
years at the Utah State Prison (R. 304-05).
After an Ex Parte Motion to Extend Time of Appeal was
granted by the district court (R. 308-09), a Notice of Appeal was
filed on June 2, 1995, by the Utah County Public Defenders
Association on behalf of Jacques and this appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On September 27, 1994, a black man entered the Art City
Pharmecy in Springville, Utah with a prescription for "percoceth"
for "James Brooks" signed by "Dr. Darrel Olson" (3/14/95 Tr. at
5

42-47, 48-50).
Valorie Seitz, an employee at the Art City Pharmecy,
testified that she was working at the pharmecy on September 27,
1994, when a black man—who she thought was approximately 6'2"
tall—came in with a prescription signed by a Dr. Darrel Olson to
be filled for James Brooks (3/14/95 Tr. at 44-45).

Seitz

testified that she became suspicious that the prescription was
forged because the requested drug, percocet, was misspelled as
"percoceth" so she asked the pharmecist to examine it (3/14/95
Tr. at 44). The pharmecist tried to call the doctor while the
man waited.

Id.

At some point the police were called, but the

man left before they arrived and without receipt of the
prescribed medication (3/14/95 Tr. at 45).
Ryan Ollerton, another employee at the Art City Pharmecy,
was also working on September 27, 1994.

Ollerton testified that

while working on that day he became aware that someone was trying
to pass a forged prescription (3/14/95 Tr. at 48). Ollerton
testified that the alleged suspect was a black man, and that
Ollerton followed him out of the store and saw the man get in a
cherry red sports car (3/14/95 Tr. at 49). Ollerton also
testified that while he was unsure of either the exact make of
the car or its license plate number, he thought that it looked
similar to the red car owned by Jacques which was admitted as
State's Exhibit 2 (3/14/95 Tr. at 49-50, 51, 52-58).
The prescription was written on an IHC prescription pad and
was signed by a Dr. Darrel Olson (State's Exhibit 1). Dr. Darrel
6

Olson, a physician employed by IHC in their Nephi, Ephraim, and
Mt. Pleasant clinics, testified that neither the handwriting nor
the signature on the prescription belonged to him and that he
never authorized anyone else to write his signature on the
prescription (3/14/95 Tr. at 29).

Olson also testified that all

three IHC clinics which he works at use the same prescription pad
and that Dr. Kim Bateman was one of his partners (3/14/95 Tr. at
30).

Olson further testified that patients were frequently left

unsupervised in the clinics and would have access to prescription
pads which were often left out in the examining rooms (3/14/95
Tr. at 31-32).
Dr. Kim Bateman, a partner of Olson's at the same IHC
clinics, identified Jacques at trial and testified that he had
examined Jacques' knee at the Ephraim clinic on September 26,
1994, and gave Jacques a prescription for a non-narcotic pain
medication (3/14/95 Tr. at 70-73).

Bateman also testified that

he had treated Jacques three times, that Jacques was left alone
in the examination room in Ephraim on September 26, 1994 (3/14/95
Tr. at 73). In addition, Bateman testified that he was familiar
with Olson's handwriting and that neither the handwriting nor the
signature on the prescription in question were Olson's (3/14/95
Tr. at 69).
Prior to trial, Jacques was ordered by the trial court to
provide a handwriting sample to the State for analysis (R. 202,
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State's Exhibit 3). 1 Alan Tipton, an officer with the
Springville Police Department, testified that he administered and
witnessed Jacques take the requested handwriting sample (3/14/95
Tr. at 54-55).

Tipton also testified that he sent the

prescription to the state crime lab to be tested for latent
prints, and that the two comparable latent prints did not match
Jacques' prints (3/14/95 Tr. at 55).
At trial, the State sought to introduce letters and court
pleadings allegedly written by Jacques.

Sherry Ragan, another

deputy Utah County attorney, was called to identify and
authenticate these writings as a nonexpert under Rule 901 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence.

Included in these writings were: State's

Exhibit 4—an envelope allegedly written by Jacques and addressed
to David Cole; State's Exhibit 9—a letter allegedly written by
Jacques to Cole; State's Exhibit 10—portions of a letter
allegedly written by Jacques to Ragan; and several pleadings also
allegedly written by Jacques that had been filed with the trial
court (State's Exhibits 12, 14, 16, 17).
Ragan first testified outside the presence of the jury
that she had prosecuted Jacques 2-3 times, that in the course of
those prosecutions she had seen his handwriting on letters and
other court documents, and that in her opinion the handwriting on
State's Exhibits looked like Jacques writing. (3/14/95 Tr. at 8089).

Jacques objected to her "familiarity" with his handwriting

throughout the proceedings, Jacques represented himself and
David Cole, a deputy Utah County attorney, represented the State.
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because she had never witnessed him write and therefore she
couldn't be sure that the writing was his, and because she was
also a prosecutor whose opinion would be biased (3/14/95 Tr. at
89-90).

The trial court ruled that Ragan was competent to give a

nonexpert opinion on handwriting under Rule 901, that the letters
and documents were written by Jacques, and that they would be
admitted into evidence under the residual hearsay exception under
Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (3/14/95 Tr. at 91, 102,
92-95).
Before the jury, Ragan testified that she was a local
attorney who has known Jacques for 6-7 years (3/14/95 Tr. at 15051).

Ragan also testified that in that period she has seen 4-5

pieces of handwriting which she believed to be Jacques (3/14/95
Tr. at 51. More specifically, Ragan testified that Exhibit 10
was from a letter she received from Jacques, that Exhibits 4 and
9 looked similar to Exhibit 10 and other pieces of Jacques
writing she had seen—although these exhibits were written to
Cole, and that she believed the handwriting on the copies of the
court documents—Exhibits 12, 14, 16, and 17—to be the same
writing as Jacques (3/14/95 Tr. at 51-53).
Chuck Senn, an officer with the Springville Police
Department, was also called by the State to testify as a
handwriting expert (3/14/95 Tr. at 108-149).

Senn testified that

in the course of his analysis he was able to locate 32 points of
identification from State's Exhibit 1—the prescription—with
which to compare Jacques' submitted handwriting sample (Exhibit
9

3) as well as the letters and documents which Ragan authenticated
(Exhibits 4, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17) (3/14/95 Tr. at 123).
Senn testified that, although he believed Jacques'
handwriting sample to be faked, he found 18-20 points of common
identification between the prescription and Jacques' handwriting
sample which led him to the conclusion that both documents were
written by the same individual (3/14/95 Tr. at 132-33, 148).
However, all of the points of common identification Senn
showed to the jury during the course of his testimony came from
the writings authenticated by Ragan (3/14/95 Tr. at 123-32).
Senn testified that in comparing the prescription with Exhibits
4, 9, and 10, he was able to find all 32 points of identification
and that therefore, all four documents were written by the same
person (3/14/95 Tr. at 131-32, 134).
After Jacques was convicted by the jury, he filed with the
trial court a motion for arrested judgment and a motion for
acquittal on the grounds that the trial court erred in allowing
Ragan to testify as a nonexpert under Rule 901 and that the
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.

Both of

Jacques' motions were denied and he was sentenced to prison on
April 19, 1995 (4/19/95 Tr.).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I.

Jacques asserts that the trial court abused its

discretion in finding deputy county attorney Sherry Ragan
competent to render nonexpert opinion on handwriting under Rule
901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
10

Ragan had never witnessed

Jacques write, which Jacques argues is the threshold of
sufficiency under State v, Freshwater, 85 P. 447 (Utah 1906).
Furthermore, Ragan's only familiarity with Jacques' writing not
gained or acquired for purposes of this litigation concerned a
single letter she allegedly received from Jacques,

Jacques

maintains that such familiarity is insufficient to meet the
requirements of Rule 901 and State v. Freshwater.

Moreover, the

trial court erred in allowing Ragan to testify concerning
documents allegedly written by Jacques during the course of this
litigation.

Rule 901(b)(2) clearly indicates that a nonexperts

familiarity with handwriting is not to be acquired for purposes
of the litigation.

Therefore, Jacques asks that this Court

vacate his conviction.
Point II.

Jacques argues that the evidence introduced by

the State at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was the person who committed the crime for which he
was convicted.

Therefore, Jacques asks this Court to reverse his

conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY
SHERRY RAGAN TO AUTHENTICATE WRITINGS AS A NONEXPERT
UNDER RULE 901 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
At trial Jacques was convicted of uttering a forged
prescription. Prior to trial a handwriting sample was taken from
Jacques and given to Chuck Senn, a handwriting expert, for
analysis (3/14/95 Tr. at 54-55, 108-49). In addition to the
11

sample, a letter written to deputy county attorney Sherry Ragan
(Exhibit 10), an envelope addressed to prosecuting attorney David
Cole (Exhibit 4), a letter written to David Cole (Exhibit 9), and
several court documents (Exhibits 12, 14, 16, 17)—all allegedly
written by Jacques—were also given to Senn for comparison with
the prescription (Exhibit 1) (3/14/95 Tr. at 108-149).
At trial Ragan's testimony was used to authenticate or
identify the letters under Rule 901(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

Jacques asserts that the trial court abused its

discretion in allowing Ragan to given nonexpert opinion on
handwriting at trial.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-25-9 states:

"Any writing may be

proved either: (1) by any one who saw the writing executed; or
(2) by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the
maker; or (3) by a subscribing witness.
Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that the
requirement of authentication or identification of evidence prior
to admission may be satisfied by evidence "sufficient to support
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims."

Rule 901(a), U.R. Evid. Rule 901(b)(2) provides the

example of authentication or identification for nonexpert
opinions on handwriting; it reads:

"Nonexpert opinion as to the

genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired
for purposes of the litigation."
This subsection was adopted in accordance with State v.
Freshwater, 85 P. 447 (Utah 1906).
12

See, Rule 901 Advisory

Committee Note.

The relevant issue in Freshwater was whether the

trial court erred in allowing a nonexpert, who had seen the
defendant write only once, to testify that the handwriting on the
envelope of a letter addressed to her was the defendant's
writing.
The Utah court held that such a writing may be proved by
such a witness who has seen the defendant write even one time.
Freshwater, 85 P. at 448.

In its opinion the Freshwater court

quoted "It has from early times been settled that no great degree
of familiarity with handwriting is required to render a witness
competent to give an opinion.

If he has seen the person write a

single time, it has generally been held sufficient" (citations
omitted).

Id.

At issue in this case is whether a nonexpert, who has never
seen the defendant write, can nonetheless authenticate or
identify his handwriting in accordance with Rule 901(b)(2) of the
Utah Rules of Evidence.

At trial Ragan admitted that she had

never actually witnessed Jacques writing (3/14/95 Tr. at 89).
While Freshwater indicates that "no great degree of familiarity
with handwriting is required to render a witness competent to
give an opinion," Jacques asserts that the threshold of
sufficiency under Freshwater and Rule 901 is that the nonexpert
witness has seen the person write—even if only once.
Moreover, Ragan herself was in receipt of only one letter
allegedly written to her by Jacques (Exhibit 10, 3/14/95 Tr. at
81).

The other writings authenticated or comparitively
13

identified by Ragan were a letter sent to the prosecuting
attorney, David Cole (Exhibit 9), an envelope addressed to David
Cole (Exhibit 4), and court documents allegedly written by
Jacques that were filed during the course of this case (Exhibits
12, 14, 16, 17) (3/14/95 Tr. at 8-11, 82-83).
Jacques asserts that Ragan's knowledge or familiarity of
Jacques' writing is insufficient to meet the requirements of Rule
901.

She only testified to receiving one document allegedly

written by Jacques.

In addition, her "familiarity" with regards

to all of the other writings—whose genuineness she rendered an
nonexpert opinion about—was acquired for purposes of this
litigation.

The letter and envelope addressed to David Cole as

well as the court pleadings were all written during the course of
this litigation.

Rule 901(b)(2) clearly states that the required

familiarity necessary for nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness
of handwriting must not acquired for purposes of the litigation.
Jacques maintains that the trial court erred in allowing
Ragan to render nonexpert opinion about her familiarity with
writings filed in the course of this litigation.

Moreover,

Jacques also asserts that the only writing whose familiarity was
not acquired for purposes of the litigation was the one letter
she herself had received.

Jacques maintains that familiarity of

one letter is insufficient under Freshwater and Rule 901 to
render her competent to render nonexpert opinion—particularly
where she has never witnessed or seen Jacques write.

14

Thereforef Jacques requests that this Court find that the
trial court abused its discretion in finding Ragan competent to
testify under Rule 901. Jacques also asks this Court to vacate
his conviction because of the inherent unfairness created by the
trial court's decision to allow Ragan, a deputy county attorney,
to give a nonexpert opinion on Jacques' handwriting based on one
letter she received and other writings filed or received in the
course of this case.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL HAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT
In order to convict a criminal defendant the State must
prove each and every element of the charge beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Jacques asserts that the State failed to meet its burden

and therefore his conviction should be reversed.
To challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal
Jacques carries a heavy burden.
supporting

He "must marshal all evidence

the jury's verdict and must then show how this

marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict."

State

v. Lemon, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted).
Jacques must demonstrate that the evidence is "sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted."

State v. Dunn, 208 Utah

Adv. Rep. 100 (Utah 1993).
Jury instruction #4 lists the essential elements of making
15

or uttering a forged prescription in violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) (R. 266). Those elements, which
each must be established by the State by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt are:

"1. That the Defendant; 2. on or about

September 27, 1994; 3. in Utah County, Utah; 4. knowingly and
intentionally; 5. did make or utter; 6. a false or forged
prescription or written order; 7. for a controlled substance."
Jacques argues that the State failed to prove element #1—his
identity in connection with the charge—beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Jacques has marshalled all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict in his statement of facts.
However, Jacques will likewise marshal here the evidence that is
relevant to his sufficiency argument.
Dr. Bateman, identified Jacques and testified that he had
examined Jacques on September 26, 1994, at the IHC clinic in
Ephraim, Utah, for a sprained knee (3/14/95 Tr. at 70-73).
Bateman also testified that Jacques was left unattended in an
examinating room and that it was common for prescription pads to
be found in plain view in such an examining room (3/14/95 Tr. at
70, 73).
Dr. Olson, whose name was signed on the prescription,
testified that he never wrote or signed such a prescription for
"James Brooks" nor did he authorize anyone else to issue such a
prescription (3/14/95 Tr. at 29).
Valorie Seitz and Ryan Ollerton, both employees at the Art
16

City Pharmecy, both testified that a "black man" came to the
pharmecy on September 27, 1994 (3/14/95 Tr. at 44-45, 49). Seitz
testified that the man, who was approximately 6'2" tall,
approached her with a prescription for "percoceth" for a "James
Brooks" that was signed by a doctor "Darrel Olson" (3/14/95 Tr.
44-45).

She testified that she became suspicious that the

prescription was forged because percocet was misspelled (3/14/95
Tr. at 44). However, before the police arrived or the medication
was given, the man left the store (3/14/95 Tr. at 45). Ollerton
testified that the man left the store and drove away in a cherry
red sports car (3/14/95 Tr. at 49) which looked similar to the
photograph of Jacques' car (Exhibit 2) he was shown at trial
(3/14/95 Tr. 50-51).
Chuck Senn testified that the prescription (Exhibit 1) had
18-20 points of common identification with the handwriting sample
which Jacques submitted per court order; and therefore, despite
his belief that Jacques had deliberately changed his writing
style on the submitted sample, Senn testified that the same
individual wrote both the sample and the prescription (3/14/95
Tr. at 132-33, 148).
Senn also compared the prescription with writings
authenticated by Sherry Ragan and found all 32 points of
identification which led to his conclusion that the prescription
and all of the writings identified by Ragan were likewise written
by the same person (3/14/95 Tr. at 131-32, 134).
Jacques asserts that the State failed to prove beyond a
17

reasonable doubt that he was the person who did make or utter a
forged prescription for a controlled substance.

Bateman was the

only witnessed who directly identified Jacques; and he identified
Jacques only as the individual whom he examined on September 26,
1994.

Ollerton and Seitz testified only that a "black man" came

to the Art City Pharmecy on September 27, 1994. Moreover,
Ollerton was unable to positively identify Jacques car as the car
that the suspect left the pharmecy in.

In addition, neither

Bateman or Olson ever saw Jacques take a prescription pad from
one of the IHC clinics.

Jacques maintains that Senn's testimony

that the prescription and the handwriting sample had 18-20 points
of common identity is insufficient to establish identification.
Therefore, Jacques requests that this Court reverse his
conviction because the evidence introduced at trial is
"sufficiently inconclusive" and that "reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted."
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Jacques requests that this Court reverse his conviction
because the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime for
which he was convicted.

Alternatively Jacques requests that this

Court vacate his conviction because the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing deputy county attorney Sherry Ragan to
give nonexpert opinion on handwriting under Rule 901 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.
18
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this L /

day of December, 1995.

Margaret/ Lindsay
Attorney for Jacques
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